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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellants Anthony P. Baratta ("Baratta") and Baratta & 
Fenerty, Ltd. ("B&F ") appeal from judgments of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania (the "District Court") (1) granting summary 
judgment in favor of appellee Coregis Insurance Company 
("Coregis") and (2) denying Baratta's and B&F 's motion for 
relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence. 
The primary issue that we must decide is whether Baratta 
and B&F could have reasonably foreseen, prior to the 
effective date of their professional liability insurance policy, 
that Baratta's handling of his clients' case involved a 
breach of professional duty that might be the basis of a 
legal malpractice claim. If the answer is yes, coverage for 
those legal malpractice claims is excluded under the policy. 
 
I. Background Facts and Procedural History  
 
Kenneth Lee sustained severe injuries to his head on 
December 19, 1978 when he fell out of the passenger door 
of his car onto a highway. He sought treatment at Sacred 
Heart Hospital ("Sacred Heart") in Norristown, Pennsylvania 
where he was initially examined by Dr. Theodore Harrison, 
the emergency room physician on staff. After it became 
apparent that Dr. Harrison would not admit Mr. Lee to 
Sacred Heart, nor transfer him to a hospital that could do 
a CAT-scan of his injuries, Mr. Lee decided to return home 
with his wife, Danielle Lee. 
 
Two days later, on December 21, 1978, Mrs. Lee returned 
home from work to find Mr. Lee collapsed on the floor. Mr. 
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Lee was then taken to St. Mary's Hospital ("St. Mary's") in 
Langhorne, Pennsylvania, arriving in the mid- to late 
morning. Mr. Lee's condition deteriorated as he was 
required to await treatment throughout the afternoon. At 
5:00 p.m., a neurologist arrived and ordered Mr. Lee 
transported to Mercer Hospital in Trenton, New Jersey for 
a CAT-scan that ultimately revealed a subdural hematoma 
and brain contusion. The physicians at Mercer Hospital 
performed emergency surgery on Mr. Lee. However, as a 
result of the delay in treatment, Mr. Lee allegedly suffered 
severe and debilitating injuries. 
 
In January of 1979, Mr. and Mrs. Lee consulted with 
Baratta, who was then with the law firm Baratta & Takiff, 
about the possibility of filing a medical malpractice case 
against Sacred Heart, St. Mary's, and the doctors who had 
treated Mr. Lee for the injuries he had suffered on 
December 19, 1978. Baratta advised the Lees that they 
should file a medical malpractice claim against Sacred 
Heart and Dr. Harrison but not against St. Mary's. He 
explained that he "was a personal friend of a Dr. Cahill, 
who was a physician at St. Mary's Hospital, and that if the 
Lees did not sue St. Mary's Hospital, [Dr. Cahill] would be 
able to testify as to the negligence of Sacred Heart Hospital 
and Dr. Harrison." 
 
On March 23, 1981, Baratta filed a complaint in the 
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas 
(the "Court of Common Pleas") on behalf of the Lees alleging 
that Sacred Heart and Dr. Harrison failed to treat and 
diagnose properly Mr. Lee's injuries. More than ten years 
later, on September 17, 1991, the Court of Common Pleas 
dismissed the Lees' suit for lack of activity. In January of 
1994, Baratta, who was by that time a partner in B&F, met 
with the Lees and informed them that their case had been 
dismissed for lack of activity but that he had taken action 
to get the case reinstated. On January 13, 1995, Mr. Lee 
sent Baratta a letter expressing his dissatisfaction with the 
handling of his case that stated in part: 
 
       You have, for whatever reason that you never 
       explained, dragged this case on since 1979. You have 
       constantly brushed off inquiries for a case status 
       report. You caused and continue to cause great 
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       anguish to me and my family by ignoring my case, my 
       plight, my right to expect you to abide by your contract 
       with me, to represent me and my best interest, in my 
       case for the medical negligence I encountered at the 
       hands of Dr. Harrison at the Sacred Heart Hospital in 
       December of 1978. 
 
On February 22, 1995, the Court of Common Pleas denied 
Baratta's petition to have the Lees' case reinstated, a 
decision that was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court on November 20, 1995, and by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania on April 18, 1996. 
 
On April 24, 1996, Baratta and B&F submitted an 
application for professional liability insurance to Coregis, 
which extended coverage under Policy No. PLL 319978-8 
(the "Policy") for the period May 6, 1996 to May 6, 1997. On 
November 6, 1996, the Lees initiated a legal malpractice 
action against Baratta and B&F by filing a Writ of 
Summons in the Court of Common Pleas. Baratta and B&F 
promptly reported this event to Coregis. On December 18, 
1996, Coregis sent a letter to Baratta and B&F reminding 
them that Exclusion B of the Policy provides that"[the] 
policy does not apply to . . . any CLAIM arising out of any 
act, error, omission or PERSONAL INJURY occurring prior 
to the effective date of this policy if any INSURED at the 
effective date knew or could have reasonably foreseen that 
such act, error, omission or PERSONAL INJURY might be 
expected to be the basis of a CLAIM . . . ." Coregis followed 
up on this letter by denying coverage in January 1997 for 
the Lees' malpractice claims against Baratta and B&F. 
 
On October 27, 1998, the Lees filed a complaint in the 
legal malpractice suit alleging, inter alia, a failure to fulfill 
contractual obligations, failure to exercise skill and 
knowledge possessed by other attorneys in the community, 
and failure to prosecute the Lees' case against Sacred Heart 
and Dr. Harrison. In addition, the complaint alleged legal 
malpractice for failing to sue St. Mary's. 
 
On November 20, 1998, Baratta and B&F renewed their 
request for coverage, which Coregis denied on February 9, 
1999. In addition, on February 3, 1999, Coregis initiated in 
the District Court a declaratory judgment action against 
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Baratta and B&F to obtain a declaration of its rights and 
obligations under the Policy. In granting Coregis' motion for 
summary judgment on August 3, 1999, the District Court 
concluded that "a reasonable attorney in the position of 
Baratta would foresee that his lack of action in the Lees['] 
medical malpractice case might be expected to be the basis 
of not only a tort claim, but also a contract claim" and that 
"Exclusion B in the 1996-97 policy . . . precludes coverage 
for the Lees' legal malpractice action against Baratta as a 
matter of law." Coregis Ins. Co. v. Baratta & Fenerty, LTD., 
57 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1999). On August 31, 
1999, Baratta and B&F appealed to this Court. 
 
Notwithstanding their appeal, on December 10, 1999, 
Baratta and B&F filed in the District Court a motion for 
relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b). The Rule 60(b) motion presented the 
District Court with newly discovered evidence contained in 
reports from Drs. Frederick J. McEliece and Joseph J. 
Levinsky that were submitted in connection with the Lees' 
legal malpractice action against Baratta and B&F in 
February and September of 1998, respectively. The 
McEliece report provides that despite "some confusion and 
at least poor communication" at Sacred Heart, there was no 
deviation from "the standard of care at the time," but with 
regard to St. Mary's, "if indeed [Kenneth Lee] arrived at 8:00 
. . . in the morning and was evaluated at that time[,] the 
delay until 2:00 P.M. until obtaining a neurosurgical 
consultation is not acceptable."1 The Levinsky report states 
that "[e]valuation of the care rendered [at Sacred Heart] 
shows no evidence of a deviation from the accepted 
standard of emergency medical care in 1978." However, 
"[e]valuation of the care at St. Mary's Hospital reveals 




1. Although the McEliece report indicates that Mr. Lee arrived at St. 
Mary's at 8:00 a.m. and had a neurological consultation at 2:00 p.m., 
the Levinsky report states that Mr. Lee arrived at 10:00 a.m. and had a 
neurological consultation at 5:00 p.m. In any case, both reports suggest 
that the interval of time at St. Mary's may have constituted negligence in 
its handling of Mr. Lee's medical care. 
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By order entered on March 17, 2000, the District Court 
denied Baratta and B&F 's Rule 60(b) motion. On March 22, 
2000, Baratta and B&F filed another appeal. By order of 
this Court on April 4, 2000, the two appeals were 
consolidated. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. Summary Judgment 
 
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a moving party is entitled to summary judgment"if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is only appropriate if 
the evidence cannot reasonably support a verdict for the 
non-moving party. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 834 F. Supp. 
854, 856 (E.D. Pa. 1993). In making this determination, all 
of the facts must be reviewed in the light most favorable to, 
and all inferences must be drawn in favor of, the non- 
moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986). Although the moving party bears the 
initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine 
issues of material fact, the non-movant must establish the 
existence of each element of his case. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
 
In the case before us, the District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Coregis after concluding that 
"[e]xclusion B in the 1996-97 policy . . . precludes coverage 
for the Lees' legal malpractice action against Baratta as a 
matter of law." 57 F. Supp. 2d at 184. We exercise plenary 
review of this decision. See Farley v. Philadelphia Hous. 
Auth., 102 F.3d 697, 700 (3d Cir. 1996); Olson v. Gen. Elec. 
Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Exclusion B of the Policy excludes coverage for acts, 
errors, or omissions occurring prior to the effective date of 
the Policy if Baratta and B&F knew or could have 
reasonably foreseen that they might be the basis of a claim. 
Baratta and B&F do not dispute that the Lees' claims arise 
out of acts, errors, or omissions occurring prior to the 
effective date of the Policy. However, they do dispute 
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whether they knew or could have reasonably foreseen prior 
to that date that these acts, errors, or omissions might be 
expected to be the basis of a claim. 
 
In Selko v. Home Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1998), 
we applied a mixed subjective/objective standard to 
determine whether claims were excluded from coverage 
under an insurance policy: 
 
       First, it must be shown that the insured knew of 
       certain facts. Second, in order to determine whether 
       the knowledge actually possessed by the insured was 
       sufficient to create a `basis to believe,' it must be 
       determined that a reasonable lawyer in possession of 
       such facts would have had a basis to believe that the 
       insured had breached a professional duty. 
 
Id. at 152. Although the exclusionary provision interpreted 
in Selko differed in language from the one before us,2 our 
holding in that case is applicable here insofar as it 
instructs us first to consider the subjective knowledge of 
the insured and then the objective understanding of a 
reasonable attorney with that knowledge. In Selko, we used 
this mixed standard to determine whether the insured had 
a "basis to believe" he had breached a professional duty. 
We will apply this same standard to determine whether 
Baratta and B&F could have reasonably foreseen that 
Baratta's prior conduct might be the basis of a claim. 
 
A. Failure To Keep Case Active Against Sacred Heart & 
       Dr. Harrison 
 
There is no question that Baratta and B&F knew, prior to 
applying for professional liability insurance, that the Court 
of Common Pleas had dismissed the Lees' medical 
malpractice complaint against Sacred Heart and Dr. 
Harrison for lack of activity and that the decision of the 
Court of Common Pleas had been affirmed by both the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The policy in Selko provided coverage for an act, error or omission 
occurring prior to the policy period "provided that prior to the effective 
date of this policy . . . the insured had no basis to believe that the 
insured had breached a professional duty." Selko, 139 F.3d at 149 n.1. 
As noted, the Policy in our case focuses on the foreseeability of a basis 
for a malpractice claim. 
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Pennsylvania Superior Court and the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania. Moreover, Baratta and B&F knew by May of 
1996 that the Lees were dissatisfied with the legal 
representation they had received. To repeat the relevant 
portion of Kenneth Lee's January 13, 1995 letter to Baratta: 
"You have, for whatever reason that you never explained, 
dragged this case on since 1979. You have constantly 
brushed off inquiries for a case status report. You caused 
and continue to cause great anguish to me and my family 
by ignoring my case, my plight, my right to expect you to 
abide by your contract with me, to represent me and my 
best interest . . . ." 
 
In our view, a reasonable attorney in possession of these 
facts would have realized that Baratta had breached a 
professional duty by failing to prosecute the Lees' case 
against Sacred Heart and Dr. Harrison, and that 
consequently there might be a basis for a claim. 3 A 
reasonable attorney also "would have realized that he had 
a dissatisfied client who would undoubtedly take further 
legal action absent a miraculous and unlikely turnaround" 
in events. Selko, 139 F.3d at 154. 
 
Baratta and B&F nevertheless contend that they had no 
reason to foresee a legal malpractice claim by the Lees 
because, by the time of the effective date of the Policy in 
May of 1996, the Lees' legal malpractice action was already 
time-barred by the Pennsylvania statute of limitations. We 
disagree. When an attorney has a basis to believe he has 
breached a professional duty, he has a reason to foresee 
that his conduct might be the basis of a professional 
liability claim against him. He cannot assume that the 
claim will not be brought because he subjectively believes it 
is time barred or lacks merit. 
 
In this case, there remains an open question whether the 
statute of limitations had run out on the Lees' malpractice 
action by the time Baratta and B&F applied for professional 
liability coverage with Coregis. Relying upon Sherman 
Industries Inc. v. Goldhammer, 683 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Pa. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. A breach of a professional duty and a basis for a claim are thus "two 
peas in a pod." If the former occurs, experience teaches that the latter 
can be expected to follow. 
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1988), Baratta and B&F argue that the statute of 
limitations began to run in January of 1994 when the Lees 
were informed that their case had been dismissed. Baratta 
and B&F maintain that they therefore had no reason to 
foresee a claim in May of 1996 because the two year statute 
of limitations under a tort theory of legal malpractice had 
expired by January of 1996. 
 
However, we do not believe that a reasonable attorney 
could have been certain in May of 1996 that the statute of 
limitations had run on the Lees' claim. In Pennsylvania, 
"the point of time at which the injured party should 
reasonably be aware that he or she has suffered an injury 
is generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury." 
Sadtler v. Jackson-Cross Co., 587 A.2d 727, 732 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991). "Only where the facts are so clear that 
reasonable minds cannot differ may the commencement of 
the limitation period be determined as a matter of law." Id. 
In the Lees' case, application of the discovery rule would 
have involved a highly fact sensitive and legally complex 
inquiry that might have resulted in equitable tolling of the 
statute of limitations. For example, Mr. Lee's letter to 
Baratta on January 13th, 1995 evidences confusion over 
whether the Lees' case had been reinstated, stating"[y]ou 
are still my attorney bound by our contract. I want from 
you, in writing, to tell me what the status of my case is, 
what you have done to correct your error, and when we can 
plan to proceed to court. You have exactly two weeks to 
reply." On the basis of this letter, the statute of limitations 
arguably was tolled if the Lees had not been provided 
sufficient information to determine whether they had 
suffered an injury meriting a malpractice action against 
their attorney. In any event, to this date the Lees' 
malpractice action against Baratta and B&F has not been 
dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. 
 
In short, we are uncertain when the statute of limitations 
began to run on the Lees' legal malpractice claim and 
whether the limitations period had expired by the effective 
date of the Policy in May of 1996. In our view, a reasonable 
attorney in Baratta and B&F 's position could not have been 
certain, and thus should not have assumed, that the 
limitations period had expired as a matter of law. Rather, a 
 
                                9 
  
reasonable attorney would have foreseen that there might 
be the basis for a claim because the statute of limitations 
may have been tolled beyond May of 1994 under the 
discovery rule. 
 
For similar reasons, we believe Baratta and B&F had 
reason to foresee that there might be the basis for a 
malpractice claim based on a breach of contract theory, for 
which the statute of limitations (of four years) had not 
expired in May of 1996. The Court of Common Pleas may 
conclude that a complete failure to prosecute the case 
against Sacred Heart constitutes a failure to perform a 
"specific instruction" by the Lees to develop and prosecute 
that case. See Edwards v. Thorpe, 876 F. Supp. 693, 694 
(E.D. Pa. 1995). Baratta and B&F were not justified in 
assuming otherwise and therefore had reason to foresee 
that there might be the basis for a claim against them. 
 
We therefore affirm the District Court's determination 
that Exclusion B of the Policy precludes coverage of the 
Lees' claim alleging that Baratta committed legal 
malpractice by failing to keep their case active against 
Sacred Heart and Dr. Harrison. 
 
B. Failure To Sue St. Mary's Hospital 
 
We also agree with the District Court's conclusion that 
Exclusion B precludes coverage of the Lees' claims 
asserting that Baratta failed to investigate and file suit 
against St. Mary's. An allegation in the complaint filed in 
the Lees' legal malpractice action against Baratta and B&F 
in October of 1998 demonstrates that Baratta knew that 
the Lees had a potential claim against St. Mary's. It alleges 
that the following exchange took place in 1979 when the 
Lees first approached Baratta with their medical 
malpractice case: 
 
       Attorney Baratta advised the Lees not to file any action 
       against St. Mary's Hospital. He stated that he was a 
       personal friend of a Dr. Cahill, who was a physician at 
       St. Mary's Hospital, and that if the Lees did not sue St. 
       Mary's Hospital, he would be able to testify as to the 
       negligence of Sacred Heart Hospital and Dr. Harrison. 
 
Baratta and B&F also knew by May of 1996 that Baratta 
had failed to prosecute that very case against Sacred Heart 
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that allegedly would have been strengthened by forgoing 
suit against St. Mary's. Finally, as the District Court 
observed, Baratta had received a letter from the Lees 
expressing their general frustration over the handling of 
their case. It alleged that Baratta had "brushed off inquiries 
for a case status report" and "dragged on" and "ignor[ed]" 
the case. 
 
We conclude that a reasonable attorney in possession of 
these facts would have foreseen that he had breached a 
professional duty by failing to investigate and pursue a case 
against St. Mary's, and that consequently there might be a 
basis for a legal malpractice claim against him. Baratta 
presented the Lees with a strategy for maximizing their 
claims against Sacred Heart, which he then botched 
through sheer negligence and inattention. Not only did he 
fail to prosecute the case against Sacred Heart that was 
allegedly strengthened by forgoing suit against St. Mary's, 
he also failed to reconsider the decision not to sue St. 
Mary's when, by his own inaction, he was not pursuing the 
case against Sacred Heart. Put another way, Baratta in 
effect excuses his failure to sue St. Mary's by his failure to 
pursue the suit already brought against Sacred Heart. The 
alleged understanding not to sue St. Mary's can have no 
preclusive effect when the predicate for that alleged 
understanding (to pursue suit against Sacred Heart and to 
use as a witness against it Dr. Cahill of St. Mary's) does not 
exist. 
 
Moreover, we agree with the District Court that"the Lee 
letter would clearly put a reasonable attorney in the same 
position as Baratta on notice that the Lees were frustrated 
about more than just the dismissal of their medical 
malpractice action" against Sacred Heart. 57 F. Supp. 2d at 
184. That letter expresses a general frustration with 
Baratta's failure to spend adequate time developing their 
case. 
 
Thus, we also affirm the District Court's determination 
that Exclusion B precludes coverage for the Lees' claim 
alleging that Baratta committed legal malpractice by failing 
to pursue a case against St. Mary's. 
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III. Relief Under Rule 60(b) 
 
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in part that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons . . . (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial." This standard requires that 
"the new evidence (1) be material and not merely 
cumulative, (2) could not have been discovered before trial 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence and (3) would 
probably have changed the outcome of the trial." Compass 
Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Labs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
Baratta and B&F sought relief under Rule 60(b) based 
upon newly discovered evidence in the McEliece and 
Levinsky reports. The District Court concluded that relief 
from judgment was not appropriate because, "[a]fter 
reviewing the newly produced report, it remains clear that 
a reasonable attorney in the position of Mr. Baratta would 
have foreseen that the Lees would likely file a malpractice 
claim against him, and therefore that Exclusion B 
precludes coverage for the Lees's legal malpractice action." 
We review this decision for abuse of discretion. See Lorenzo 
v. Griffith, 12 F.3d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 1993); Harris v. Martin, 
834 F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
The McEliece report was prepared on February 11, 1998, 
and the Levinsky report was prepared seven months later 
on September 21, 1998. Baratta and B&F discovered these 
reports in November of 1999 through the Lees' responses to 
interrogatories submitted to them on September 15, 1999 
in connection with their action against Baratta and B&F for 
legal malpractice. The reports seem to suggest that (1) the 
Lees were not damaged by Baratta's failure to keep the 
Lees' medical malpractice case against Sacred Heart and 
Dr. Harrison active because Sacred Heart and Dr. Harrison 
followed accepted standards of medical care and that (2) 
the Lees were damaged by Baratta's failure to include St. 
Mary's as a defendant in the case because St. Mary's 
deviated from accepted standards of medical care. 
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These reports do not undermine the District Court's 
determination that Baratta and B&F had reason to foresee 
on or before the effective date of the Policy that Baratta's 
handling of the Lees' case might be expected to be the basis 
of a claim. In fact, we believe these reports demonstrate 
how off the mark Baratta was in advising the Lees to sue 
Sacred Heart instead of St. Mary's, and therefore reinforce 
our belief that Baratta and B&F should have known by May 
of 1996 that Baratta had breached a professional duty in 
his handling of this case that provided the basis for a claim 
against him.4 The District Court therefore acted within its 
discretion to deny Rule 60(b) relief from judgment on the 
ground that the McEliece and Levinsky reports would not 
have changed the outcome of its decision. See Compass 
Tech., 71 F.3d at 1130. 
 
* * * * * 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the District 
Court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of 
Coregis because Exclusion B precludes coverage of the 
Lees' legal malpractice claims against Baratta and B&F. We 
also affirm the judgment of the District Court denying Rule 
60(b) relief from judgment. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We also note that the McEliece and Levinsky reports, published on 
February 11, 1998 and September 21, 1998 respectively, probably could 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence before 
the District Court entered judgment on September 15, 1999, and 
therefore do not qualify as "newly discovered evidence" justifying Rule 
60(b) relief from judgment. 
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